Online multiplayer games are exemplary cases of the overlapping rule sets that are negotiated in the digital era. Game rules are used to establish a field of interaction at once familiar and strange, a deliberately differentiated site for competitive, social, cultural and commercial exchange. Game rules created by developers in the establishment of an online digital game space intersect and overlap with rules created socially by players, with cultural norms emerging from within the game space and from the contexts of play, with legal rules developed by lawyers managing the interests of publishers and with laws and values originating in the real world contexts of players in whichever legal jurisdiction they are located. These heterotopian spaces are sites of negotiation and conflict on a number of levels. 2 EVE Online, a space--themed massively multiplayer online game (MMOG), with over half a million subscribers, actively encourages player participation in game VOLUME20 NUMBER1 MAR2014 78 management, with a player council, the Council of Stellar Management (CSM), and active fan forums. The CSM is a unique management strategy not generally found in other MMOGs. It affords players a channel of communication with the developers and managers of the game and, at least in theory, an avenue for negotiation and some say in management decisions and the directions in which the game develops.
platform. Assumptions are made that all disputes should therefore be able to be settled by recourse to the contract. However, this reflects a very limited understanding of the effective governance mechanisms that operate within such environments and, indeed, of the power of contracts generally. 4 Contracts are binding between the platform provider and the player and while many purport to set standards of players' behaviour towards one another, they are enforceable only by the parties to the contract. As an interplayer regulatory mechanism, this requires the platform provider to be prepared to become involved in player--to--player disputes and to enforce the EULA directly against the player it determines to be in breach of the contract. In most game worlds, platform providers have neither the resources nor the inclination to become involved in such disputes.
Further, most EULAs do not descend to the level of specificity relevant to most player versus player disputes (although they may to some, such as allegations of copyright infringement). Therefore, the EULA only pertains to certain kinds of conflict with and surrounding the game and is not relevant to disputes regarding many aspects of gameplay.
How then are such disputes to be managed? How are other players able to punish, prevent or exclude a bad actor? If we accept the practical realities of the limited involvement of the platform provider, how complete is the EULA as a descriptor of governance? In particular we are interested in marginal player behaviour, conduct that pushes the boundaries of the rules as prescribed by the EULA, such as modding, griefing and cheating, which we have called 'disruptive practices'. 5 In this context, we are concerned with the relationship between rules and social norms, noting that both of these have an impact upon, and undermine the realities of, the contractual space of the game.
-THE GAME RULES
A typical MMOG such as EVE will involve layers of overlapping and potentially conflicting rule sets. 6 In his book Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Lessig explained that four factors affect regulation on a given point: law, norms, architecture and the market. 7 All these factors are present in the governance of EVE.
However, as Lessig went on to elaborate in the software and online context, law and architecture function through the underlying code. Lessig's concern was that this VOLUME20 NUMBER1 MAR2014 80 code, unlike most laws, does not operate transparently and is not subject to judicial or public scrutiny or review. Players learn to play with and against the code, and it is this tension between control and creativity that keeps the game space interesting. 8 The platform developers will have coded certain rules into the game environment. For example, EVE is unusual in the game field because the main focus of the player's game play is on space ships and big picture action, rather than on an individual avatar. 9 This influences the player's perspective and involvement in the game play. Other coded rules may relate to how goods may be transported, how transactions may be effected, the nature and features of various categories of spaceships, the strength of certain items and zoning of regions of play.
The EULA (or terms of service) is the mechanism that authorises platform managers to control and run the environment (law and architecture as code, reinforced by the EULA). Players must accept this contract and the terms of service or use in order to join and remain in the game. There are also additional layers of rules regarding use of the website, player forums and chat channels, a privacy policy, a reimbursement policy and a ban policy (another layer of law The Mittani, the player at the centre of our case study below, has a history of run--ins with the game management, having been involved with the Band of Brothers scandal in 2009 and a number of other controversial incidents.
Notably, CCP warns players that it is 'a tough galaxy out there, and anyone could betray you'. 18 The same applies to griefing: 'The EVE universe is a harsh universe largely driven by such conflict and notice must be taken of the fact that nonconsensual combat alone is not considered to be grief play per the above several times each year to meet with game developers and provide feedback on gameplay and proposed changes. The CSM is responsible for identifying issues that are important to players and escalating the most important of these to CCP. CCP examines these issues and determines whether it will support or deny the proposed issues or topics. Thus the involvement of the CSM functions at both developer and management levels. Clearly such a process involves significant effort and expenditure from the members of CSM and CCP. In reality, this system operates as a formalised version of the practice used in many other MMOG environments where the development team seeks guidance and feedback from guilds they identify as influential. This is usually done to formulate future directions, particularly when proposed developments constitute a significant change in gameplay environment.
One key difference is the process where members of the CSM are elected by the player base. This gives formality to the process and implies player buy--in to the process, as suggested by Óskarsson's definition of the CSM as a 'deliberative democracy': 'a hybrid governance solution which combines consensus decree with representative authority'. 24
Of course, this is simply an illusion. The engagement of the CSM is in reality a consultative committee with no formal democratic power or accountability by CCP to their requests. Its power rests in the informal domain of accountability through publicity and community mobilisation rather than a formal power structure. The nature of the elected CSM is made possible by the specific structures of the gameits evolution into a hierarchically structured system with formalised conventions of play. Therefore, it may be extremely difficult to extrapolate any general lessons or outcomes for other platforms from the operation of the CSM, as the in--game structures of EVE facilitate and support these voting mechanisms. As we will discuss, the relationship between these in game alliances and the functioning of the CSM is also unclear. CSM members are designated as 'representatives' of the players, but this implies that such interests are homogenous. Further, representatives are 'expected to uphold the social contract that all society members are held accountable to, but should also set a behaviour standard for everyone else to follow'. 25 Changes to the CSM election system have recently been implemented in the election of CSM8 in 2013. Candidates are now required to enter into a pre--election ballot, with the top twenty--one of these candidates able to enter the final ballot.
Players may then vote, ranking the candidates one to fourteen, with fourteen members elected in this fashion. In addition, the five delegates to the summit will be chosen by CCP and the CSM on the basis of their contribution and hard work, with a further two delegates chosen by player vote. 26 How this will affect the operation and accountability of the CSM remains to be seen.
-EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CSM?
Given the novelty of the CSM as a governance mechanism there has been academic and industry analysis of its effectiveness and performance, as well as more that a games company might use the activities of its players as labour that contributes to the development and maintenance of the game and its community is not new and not unique to CCP. 28 Whether this is exploitation is a matter of opinion.
The boundary between work and play is increasingly blurring in many aspects of networked digital activities. Players variously engage in huge amounts of work--like activities as a hobby, a leisure--time pursuit, a means of participation in community, a pathway into industry and paid work, or some combination of these. They are often quite strategic and knowing in this engagement (not duped into it) and thus the question of whether this is exploitative on the part of the company is somewhat vexed. It is indeed free labour, but often freely given as well. As Banks and Humphreys suggest, players will often withdraw when they perceive the activity to have crossed the line into being work. 29 We will now consider two recent controversies that highlight the role of the CSM and the tensions and issues that can arise in the context of players' various roles within the CSM, as individuals, representatives, characters and go--betweens.
-'MONOCLEGATE'
With the launch of the Incarna expansion in 2011, CCP introduced real money microtransactions for vanity items. All these items were priced at levels the players considered excessive, with the poster child of this vanity store being a monocle, selling for $70. The suggestion was that CCP were looking to wring extra money out of players, especially the high--end, dedicated players who had already invested significant time and money in the game. Several internal CCP memos were leaked which dismissed player concerns and indicated that further transaction costs were to come.
Microtransactions and the introduction of real money trade are seen by many players as destroying the game balance, with players being able to buy their way into positions of advantage within the game, rather than achieving those positions through skill. Although the items for sale in this instance were 'vanity' and did not give gameplay advantage, they were seen to be opening the door to this possibility.
In The announcement went on to note that although the policy of CCP was to not discuss individual bans and warnings, this situation was 'unique, because the panel was displayed via CCP's Fanfest video stream, a platform analogous to our forums'. 34 This is interesting for the ways it highlights how out--of--game behavior can be punished through in--game sanctions, but also for the ways various web--based media allows material to be spread and de--contextualised. Had the Q&A session not been streamed, saved, archived and made searchable, it is doubtful the comments would have received much attention.
Of course, there is a clear question of whether such conduct was in fact a breach of the EULA as it did not occur within the game itself, but rather at an official event The Mittani was later to elaborate on these thoughts in his announcement that he was formally declining the position of chairman of CSM 7:
I have come to the conclusion that my two roles in EVE-that of the Chairman of the CSM as Alexander Gianturco, and the leader of Goonswarm as 'The Mittani' are increasingly incompatible. It is, fundamentally, a problem of hats.
As the leader of Goonswarm I must be willing to make ruthless decisions and take actions that many players find objectionable-griefing, behaviour rules. 42 The key point is that in--game activities are inconsequential and removed from everyday life. There have been many critiques of this idea of separation. 43 should hold the power to determine the conduct of the game. While such schemas seem neat in their delineation of powers, they tend to ignore the agency and power of associated communities and players as well as the introjections of the non--game world into the game world, despite cries for adherence to the separation.
The situation discussed here demonstrates that governance by code alone will not satisfy player or provider expectations. 45 firstly, is that the rigidity of formalised codes often sits abrasively with more dynamic socially formed codes. Second, CCP is always ultimately dependent on the goodwill of its player population. So the balance between stepping in and exerting power and alienating its player population is a delicate one and one which players are aware of. The CSM is an attempt to collaborate in governance with the player population. Imposing a rule like this is more an attempt to enforce sovereignty.
Rule--breakers may also use strategies that emanate from outside the game (such as mobilising the media, mounting law suits, or invoking government regulation), depending on the nature of the transgression. CCP itself is subject to legal constraints and must act with an eye to its responsibilities within the broader regulatory system. What is notable is the very contingent and historically specific nature of these breaches, and that a universalised solution in a global environment with wildly varying games (and game rules) is no solution at all.
-CONCLUSIONS
What lessons can be learnt from recent controversies involving the CSM for EVE and other online communities? EVE consciously and deliberately sets itself apart from other game worlds. As noted above, in the past CCP has chosen quite deliberately when to intervene in scams and controversies and when to abstain, clearly having decided that some bad behaviour is play enhancing and some damaging. It has also worked hard to establish and maintain the CSM and is currently reviewing and revising the body's role. It should be noted, however, that we are not suggesting EVE is a democracy or that it should be. 50 EVE is a carefully constructed and maintained game environment, and the players accept the conceit that they operate in a lawless future of space piracy and sabotage. In fact, CCP prescribes the limits of player behaviour but attempts to do so with a nearly invisible regulatory hand. The CSM, as a clearly recognisable player consultative committee drawn from the elite ranks of players, assists CCP in this charade, while also helping developers and managers recognise and respond to 
